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Abstract
This paper examines “hysteresis” in which persistent unemployment takes
on structural characteristics over time. Hysteresis is modeled as deteri-
oration in labor market matching efficiency as the average duration of
unemployment increases. This is embedded in a simple New Keynesian
macro model. A decline in labor market matching efficiency would be
consistent with the observed rightward shift of the Beveridge curve since
the 2007-09 recession. Hysteresis is shown to lead to larger and more per-
sistent responses of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration
to productivity, intertemporal preference and monetary shocks. Hystere-
sis also generates an increase in the natural rate of unemployment.
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1 Introduction
Persistent elevated levels of long-term unemployment in the wake of the 2007-
09 recession have generated renewed concern about “hysteresis” effects in which
cyclical unemployment takes on structural characteristics over time. One mech-
anism by which this could take place would be a decline in the matching effi-
ciency of the labor market. The apparent rightward shift of the Beveridge curve
relationship between vacancies and unemployment in the US (Fig. 1) and other
countries indicates such a decrease may have occurred.
This paper introduces a mechanism for modeling hysteresis in a simple New
Keynesian model. Hysteresis takes the form of a decrease in labor market match-
ing efficiency as the average duration of unemployment rises. This reflects the
deterioration of labor market connections between workers and firms (e.g., the
loss of information generated through informal networks) as workers are un-
employed for long periods. Hysteresis is shown to generate larger and more
persistent responses of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration to
productivity, intertemporal preference and monetary shocks.
By endogenously increasing the persistence of responses of model variables
to shocks, hysteresis provides a mechanism that can help address what Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) call the “persistence problem” - the well-known
difficulty of macroeconomic models in matching the dynamics of aggregate vari-
ables like output following shocks.
The notion of hysteresis as a mechanism for understanding persistent high
unemployment was raised by Blanchard and Summers (1986) in the context of
Europe in the 1980s with a model that featured an “insider-outsider” mechanism
a la Lindbeck and Snower (1988) in which unemployed “outsiders” lose influence
over the labor market1.
1This was recently revisited by Gal´ı (2015) which integrates an insider-outsider mecha-
nism into a New Keynesian model to account for the apparent nonstationarity of European
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More recently, concerns about whether persistent unemployment might take
on structural characteristics or increase the natural rate have been widely ex-
pressed. For example, at his Nov. 2, 2011 press conference, then-Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke said:
Cyclical unemployment, left untreated, so to speak, for a long time
can become structural unemployment as people lose skills, as they
lose attachment to the labor force, as their work networks dry up and
so on. So in that respect, it’s important for us to try to address the
unemployment problem while it’s still amenable to monetary policy.
As shown in Fig. 2, the both the median and mean duration of unemploy-
ment spells in the US have reached unprecedented levels, and remain consider-
ably elevated even relative to the rates prevailing following earlier recessions.
A number of studies have shown channels through which matching may
be more difficult for long-term unemployed workers. In Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998), workers’ skills decline during periods of unemployment. Based on survey
evidence, Krueger and Mueller (2011) find that search intensity declines with
unemployment duration. Kroft et al. (2012), Ghayad (2013) and Eriksson and
Rooth (2014) find that employers are less likely to respond to job applications
from candidates in long spells of unemployment.
A decline in matching efficiency would be reflected in an outward shift of
the Beveridge curve. That such a shift has occurred has been widely noted and
examined - e.g., Diamond (2013), Hobijn and Sahin (2012) and Dickens and
Triest (2012). Further evidence of a decline in matching efficiency in the US
is provided by Lubik (2013) and Gregory et al. (2014). In an estimated New
Keynesian model with shocks to matching efficiency, Furlanetto and Groshenny
(2013), find that decreases in efficiency led to higher unemployment as well
as a higher natural rate of unemployment in the Great Recession. Ghayad
and Dickens (2012) show that the shift of the US Beveridge Curve is largely
unemployment rates.
3
driven by the long-term unemployed and Arpaia and Turrini (2014) find that
long-term unemployment plays a key role in explaining decreases in matching
efficiency in EU countries2. Barnichon and Figura (2015) examine the role
of the composition of unemployment in terms of worker characteristics and
dispersion across markets; their estimates show that the increased duration
of unemployment spells has made a substantial contribution to the decline in
matching efficiency in the US in recent years. This is consistent with the fact
that most of the apparent shift in the Beveridge curve is attributable to the
long-term unemployed; Fig. 3 shows separate Beveridge curves generated with
persons unemployed more than 27 weeks and those unemployed 27 or fewer
weeks as a percentages of the civilian labor force.
A number of papers have examined the relationship between monetary pol-
icy and hysteresis. Ball (1999) finds that countries that responded to recessions
in the early 1980s with expansionary monetary policy were spared the persistent
increases in unemployment that occurred in those which did not. Stockham-
mer and Sturn (2012) also find less hysteresis (measured by changes in natural
rate estimates) in recessions that are followed by more expansionary monetary
policy. Ball (2009) finds that large changes in estimated NAIRUs are generally
preceded by disinflation, and also that run-ups in inflation rates lead to NAIRU
decreases. In a study of OECD countries, Llaudes (2005) shows that the fit of
the Phillips curve relationship is improved by assigning a lower weight to long-
term unemployment; this is particularly true for Europe. Using more recent US
data, Rudebusch and Williams (2016) also find that long-term unemployed have
less influence on the Phillips Curve and Ball and Mazumder (2014) find that us-
ing short run unemployment improves estimates of the inflation-unemployment
2Ahn and Hamilton (2014) and Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) show compositional effects
are important in the rightward shift of the Beveridge curve. Workers who involuntarily lost
a job permanently are disproportionally represented among the long-term unemployed and
these workers have lower exit rates from unemployment.
4
relationship. Krueger et al. (2014) find evidence that the long-term unemployed
not only have less influence on inflation, but also that lower matching probabil-
ities for long-term unemployed persons can help account for the rightward shift
of the Beveridge curve.
The labor market issues considered in this paper contribute to a broader
reduction in aggregate supply resulting from a period of low aggregate demand.
Summers (2014) calls hysteresis “the shadow cast forward on economic activity
by adverse cyclical developments.” Reifschneider et al. (2013) find evidence
that this has occurred in the US post-2008. The US Congressional Budget
Office (2014) cited elevated long-term unemployment as a contributing factor
in revising downward its estimates of potential output. Ball (2014) reports
substantial declines in potential output across OECD countries.
The model presented below follows the setup of Ravenna and Walsh (2011)
but, unlike that model, also includes real wage rigidity. This is part of a a grow-
ing literature integrating labor market search and matching into New Keynesian
models, including Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), Faia (2008), Thomas
(2008), Trigari (2009), Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010), Tang (2010) and Christiano,
Trabandt and Walentin (2011). This line of research builds on earlier work by
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) that introduced labor market search into
Real Business Cycle models. An alternative approach to understanding per-
sistent unemployment in a model with labor market search is given by Farmer
(2012).
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2 Model
2.1 Households
A representative household of unit measure maximizes expected liftetime utility
from consumption,
U = E
∞∑
t=0
βtDt
C1−σt
1− σ (1)
where σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consump-
tion, C, is an aggregate of market produced goods, Cm, and output from home
production, where zh is the productivity of unemployed household members and
L is the fraction of the household that is employed. Hence, C = Cm+zh(1−L).
As is standard in the literature using labor market search in business cycle
models, following Merz (1995), the household members are assumed pool con-
sumption so consumption of employed and unemployed household members is
the same. The discount factor, β, is multiplied by an intertemporal preference
shifter, D, which represents variation in the household’s impatience3 - shocks to
this variable can be thought of as representing shocks to desired saving which
might, for example, result from a financial crisis. This discount shock evolves
in an autoregressive fashion,
lnDt = ρD lnDt−1 + εD,t (2)
and D has a mean of 1. The household can purchase one-period nominal bonds
with a payoff of 1 for price q, and market-produced consumption goods at price
P . It earns a wage, w, and receives the profits, Ξ, from the final goods firms
(described below) which it owns. Its budget constraint is thus
PtC
m
t + qtBt+1 ≤ wtLt + Ξt +Bt. (3)
3For a discussion of intertemporal shocks, see Primicieri et al. (2006).
6
Household optimization implies
qt = βE
Dt+1
Dt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
1
pit+1 + 1
(4)
where pit+1 is the inflation rate between t and t+1. This implies that an increase
in Dt, ceteris paribus, lowers the price of bonds (or, alternatively, raises the
nominal interest rate, i, where qt =
1
1+it
).
2.2 Intermediate Goods Production
Perfectly competitive intermediate goods firms hire workers and produce output,
which is sold to final goods firms that transform it into differentiated final
products. This separation between intermediate and final goods production is
for analytical convenience: separating the wage-setting problem, which involves
the intermediate goods firm, and the price-setting problem which occurs at the
final goods stage removes the complications of interactions between the two.4
Firms hire labor and use it to produce a homogeneous intermediate good
using a linear technology. To post a vacancy, intermediate goods firms pay a
cost, κ. Intermediate goods output is thus given by
Yt = ztLt − κVt (5)
where V is the number of vacancies. Productivity, z, has a mean of one and
follows the process
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εz,t (6)
4This is a commonly-made assumption; Thomas (2011) examines the implications of re-
laxing it.
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2.3 The Labor Market
Separations are assumed to occur at an exogenous5 rate, δ, and hires are given
by H, so the labor employed at date t is given by
Lt = (1− δ)Lt−1 +Ht (7)
The number of unemployed at the beginning of period t is given by
Ut = 1− (1− δ)Lt−1 (8)
Matches are formed according to the matching function,
Ht = AtV
α
t U
1−α
t (9)
where A represents the productivity of the matching technology, which depends
on the duration of unemployment in a manner described below. Labor market
tightness is the ratio of vacancies to unemployed, x = VU . The probability that
a vacancy is successfully filled is thus Axα−1, which is decreasing in x, while
the probability that an unemployed worker will find a job is given by Axα.
The average duration of unemployment, denoted Mt, is
Mt =
δ
Ut
Lt−1 +
∞∑
i=2
i−1∏
j=1
(
1−At−jxαt−j
)Lt−i · i
 (10)
which evolves according to
Mt =
Ut−1
Ut
(1−At−1xαt−1)Mt−1 + 1 (11)
5Shimer (2012) finds that increases in unemployment are predominately accounted for by
decreases in job-finding rather than increases in the rate of exit from employment.
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Using bars to denote steady state values, the steady state beginning-of-period
duration of unemployment is given by M¯ = 1
Axα
. Hysteresis enters the model
as a decrease in matching efficiency as the duration of unemployment increases
according to
At = A¯e
−γ(MtM¯ −1) (12)
Where A¯ is a normalization constant. The degree of hysteresis can be governed
by the parameter γ where γ = 0 is the “no hysteresis” case. The functional
form allows for “reverse hysteresis” (Ball, 1999) where a tight labor market can
reduce the natural rate of unemployment over time.
Letting W denote the real wage, wP , and V
E and V U the values of being
employed and unemployed, respectively, V E is given by:
V Et = Wt + βEt
Dt+1
Dt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ [
(1− δ + δAt+1xαt+1)V Et+1
+ δ(1−At+1xαt+1)V Ut+1
]}
.
(13)
The second term is the discounted expected future value, where the probability
of separating and being rehired is δAt+1x
α
t+1. The value of unemployment is:
V Ut = z
h + βEt
Dt+1
Dt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ [
(1−At+1xαt+1)V Ut+1 +At+1xαt+1V Et+1
]
. (14)
The household’s surplus, SH , from a match is the difference between the value
of employment and unemployment. That is, SH = V Et − V Ut . Substituting and
rearranging yields the following expression,
SHt = Wt − zh + β(1− δ)Et
Dt+1
Dt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
(1−At+1xαt+1)SHt+1. (15)
Firms will post vacancies until the expected value of doing so equals the cost,
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which implies
Atx
α−1
t V
J
t = κ (16)
where V Jt the value to a firm of a filled job (which is identical to the firm’s
surplus, since the value to a firm of an unfilled job is zero).
A Nash bargain would divide match surplus according to the rule (1−ξ)SH =
ξV J where ξ is the firm’s share resulting from is relative bargaining power.
Applying this yields, after some algebra, an expression for the Nash-bargained
real wage,
WNt =z
h +
ξ
1− ξ
κ
At
x1−αt
− β(1− δ) ξκ
1− ξEt
Dt+1
Dt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
1
At+1
x1−αt+1 − xt+1
) (17)
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) showed that the search and matching model
has difficulty matching cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies with
Nash-bargained real wages. This is because wage movements leave firms with
little incentive to adjust vacancies; the inclusion of real wage rigidities can im-
prove its performance in this regard. As in Kruse and Lubik (2007), Faia (2008)
and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) real wage rigidities are implemented by assum-
ing that real wages are a weighted average of the wage that would be arrived at
through Nash bargaining and their steady state value, W¯ ,
Wt = λW
N
t + (1− λ)W¯ (18)
where λ governs the degree of real wage flexibility.
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2.4 Price-Setting
Letting pI denote the price of the intermediate good, a producing firm chooses its
vacancy posting (and, thus, its labor) to maximize expected profits, discounted
according to the utility of the households that own it. Its first-order condition
yields the following expression for the intermediate goods price, pI , expressed
relative to the final goods price, P ,
pIt
Pt
=
1
zt
[
Wt +
κ
At
x1−αt − β(1− δ)κEt
Dt+1
Dt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ x1−αt+1
At+1
]
(19)
The price of goods reflects not only the cost of labor, but also the cost of job
posting, as well as the discounted value of future job posting costs saved by
hiring in the current period.
The competitive intermediate goods firms sell their output to final goods
firms that transform it, costlessly, into differentiated final products. From their
point of view, the real price of intermediate goods represents their real marginal
cost, i.e., p
I
P = MC.
Product varieties are indexed by 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 and the household’s consumption
bundle is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of all the varieties,
C =
[∫ 1
0
c(i)
ν−1
ν di
] ν
ν−1
(20)
where ν is the elasticity of substitution. If prices were flexible, the final goods
firms would set their prices at a constant markup, µ = νν−1 over (nominal)
marginal cost, i.e., P = µpI .
Following Calvo (1983), a fraction, 1 − θ, of firms can reset their prices in
each time period. Letting p˜t denote the price set by price-changing firms, the
11
overall price index evolves according to
Pt =
[
(1− θ)p˜1−νt + θP 1−νt−1
] 1
1−ν . (21)
The price-changing firms maximize
∞∑
s=0
θsEtQt+s
[
p˜tYt+s|t − ψ(Yt+s|t)
]
(22)
where ψ(·) is the cost function and Q represents the stochastic discount factor.
A first-order Taylor expansion of the price-changing firms’ first-order condition
yields, after some algebra, a New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
pit ' βEtpit+1 + (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
M̂Ct (23)
where M̂Ct represents the percentage deviation of real marginal cost from its
steady state value, 1µ .
2.5 Closing the Model
Two additional conditions are needed to close the model. The first is the market-
clearing condition that
Cmt = Yt (24)
Note that this definition of GDP excludes home production, as does its coun-
terpart in the national income and product accounts.
The other condition is a description of monetary policy. The monetary au-
thority is assumed to follow the canonical “Taylor Rule” where nominal interest
rates respond to inflation and the output gap, ygap, which is defined as the log
12
difference between flexible-price and actual output. That is,
it = − lnβ + φpipit − φyygapt + νMt (25)
where − lnβ is the equilibrium natural rate of interest in a zero-inflation steady
state, and φpi and φy govern the monetary policy responses to inflation and the
output gap, respectively. In order to investigate the implications of changing
matching efficiency due to hysteresis, the flexible-price level of output is cal-
culated from the model with no price or real wage rigidities, but the level of
matching efficiency, A, is assumed to evolve as under sticky prices and real wage
rigidity. The monetary policy shock, νMt , follows an AR(1) process,
νMt = ρMν
M
t−1 + ε
M
t (26)
3 Solution and Results
The model is log-linearized and solved using Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011).
The parameterization, summarized in Table 1, is quarterly and largely follows
that of Ravenna and Walsh (2011) and, otherwise, employs mainstream values
in the literature.
Following Ravenna and Walsh (2011), A¯ and κ are set so that steady state
employment, N¯ , is 0.94, and the hiring rate in the steady state is 0.9. Productiv-
ity in home production of unemployed workers, zh, is also taken from Ravenna
and Walsh (2011); although the model does not feature unemployment benefits,
it can also be interpreted as being akin to the replacement ratio from unem-
ployment insurance. The real wage adjustment parameter follows Blanchard
and Gal´ı (2010); Faia (2008) uses a similar value (0.6). The persistence of the
discount shocks, 0.7, is set to be in line with results from estimated DSGE
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models such as Sala, So¨derstro¨m and Trigari (2008), Justiniano, Primiceri and
Tambalotti (2010) and Gar´ın, Lester and Sims (2016). The persistence of the
monetary shocks corresponds with the experiment of a “moderately persistent”
shock discussed in Gal´ı (2008, ch. 3).
Fig. 4 shows the median duration of unemployment spells (in quarters) and
matching efficiency, calculated as H/(V 0.5U0.5) where H and U are the quar-
terly average level of hires and unemployment and V is the quarterly average
level of openings, which is calculated with a 1-month lag because the JOLTS
openings series is end-of-month. The inverse relationship apparent in the figure
is consistent with the model: rise in the duration of unemployment spells around
the 2008-09 recession corresponds with a decrease in matching efficiency, and,
as duration has fallen since then, efficiency has begun to rise. A regression of
efficiency on duration yields a coefficient of 0.42, which is the basis for setting
γ = 0.4 for the cases with hysteresis below.
Impulse responses are generated for one standard deviation negative produc-
tivity shocks, negative discount (intertemporal preference) shocks, and positive
(contractionary) monetary shocks under two cases: hysteresis (γ = 0.4) and no
hysteresis (γ = 0).
The response of unemployment which, measured at the end of period, is
1−L, to a contractionary productivity shock is shown in Fig. 5. In the absence
of hysteresis, firms respond to the shock by sharply reducing vacancies (shown in
Fig. 6) which leads to a jump in unemployment. Hysteresis implies that hiring
will be more costly in the future, so, in the presence of hysteresis, firms will
not cut back their hiring as much in the present. The smoother adjustment of
vacancies under hysteresis causes unemployment to rise for several periods before
beginning to fall. Note that because matching efficiency is lower after the shock,
hysteresis implies firms need to post more vacancies in the later periods. The
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introduction of hysteresis also generates a larger and more persistent increase
in the duration of unemployment spells shown in Fig. 7.
Dynamics of inflation and interest rates are shown in Fig. 8. The decrease
in productivity is a negative supply shock, and is therefore inflationary; while
this also creates an output gap, under the chosen parameters, the net effect
through the Taylor rule is an increase in interest rates. In the absence of hys-
teresis, vacancies drop sharply immediately after the shock, reducing labor mar-
ket tightness and real marginal cost, so the increases in inflation and interest
rates are less in the first period, but then higher in the second period, when
vacancies recover quickly and marginal cost rises. With hysteresis, because of
the smoother dynamics of unemployment and vacancies, there is more inflation
and a larger increase in interest rates in the first period, but not a large jump in
the second period. With hysteresis, inflation and interest rates return to their
steady states more slowly over time.
A discount shock, where households reduce their weight on present con-
sumption, also leads to an increase in unemployment. As with the productivity
shock, the response of unemployment, shown in Fig. 9, is more gradual but
more persistent with hysteresis.
The discount shock is deflationary, and monetary rule implies a cut in in-
terest rates. As Fig. 10 shows, the deflationary impact and resulting interest
rate response are sharper in the absence of hysteresis because of the immediate
increase in unemployment. With hysteresis the initial decreases in inflation and
interest rates are smaller, but slightly more persistent.
Similarly, hysteresis also leads to a more persistent unemployment response
to a contractionary monetary policy shock, shown in Fig. 11.
Model standard deviations of output, vacancies and unemployment are re-
ported in Table 2. At a quarterly frequency over the period when US JOLTS
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data is available, 2001 Q1 - 2015 Q4, the standard deviation of the unemploy-
ment rate is 26.8% (or 1.72 pt)6 and the standard deviation of the vacancy
rate is somewhat lower, at 17.0% (0.47 pt). In the absence of hysteresis, the
model generates excessive volatility of vacancies relative to unemployment, with
a standard deviation of the vacancy rate nearly twice that of unemployment.
By reducing the volatility of vacancies while increasing that of unemployment,
hysteresis improves the ability of the model to better capture their relative
volatilities. Hysteresis also increases slightly the volatility of output.
Table 3 reports autocorrelations of several variables in the model. In data,
output, vacancies and unemployment are all highly autocorrelated. The inclu-
sion of hysteresis helps generate persistence in the model that is closer to the
data. At quarterly frequency, the autocorrelations of the US job openings and
unemployment rates are 0.94 and 0.98, respectively, over 2001 Q1 - 2015 Q4
(going back to 1948 Q1, the autocorrelation of the unemployment rate is 0.97).
The effect of hysteresis on model-generated autocorrelations is particularly note-
worthy for the vacancy rate. In the absence of hysteresis, since vacancies are
a ‘jump’ variable, the model generates a high volatility of the vacancy rate
and the dynamics are such that the autocorrelation is negative. Although the
model-generated autocorrelation remains considerably less than in the data, the
addition of hysteresis moves it closer to its empirical counterpart7.
The “natural rate” of unemployment can be proxied by the unemployment
rate that would prevail under flexible prices and real wages, taking as given the
changes in hiring costs due to hysteresis. Figure 12 illustrates that, in response
to a negative productivity shock, both the unemployment rate (under hysteresis)
and the natural rate (labelled “Flexible Price”) increase as the productivity of
6Over the period 1948 Q1 - 2015 Q4, the standard deviation of the unemployment rate is
similar: 28.2% (1.64 pt).
7Fujita and Ramey (2007) show that another approach to generating more persistence in
the vacancy rate is to incorporate a sunk cost for vacancy creation.
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employed household members falls relative to those engaged in home production.
The increase in unemployment is somewhat smaller when wages and prices are
flexible.
Wage and price rigidities are more important for the dynamics in response
to discount and monetary shocks. The response to the discount shock is shown
in Fig. 13. In the absence of hysteresis (not shown), the natural rate moves
very little. With hysteresis, the increase in hiring costs cause the flexible price
unemployment rate to rise over time; the unemployment rate with sticky prices
converges to the natural rate as the effects of wage and price rigidities die out.
Note that flexible price unemployment initially declines slightly as firms would
bring forward hiring in anticipation of higher matching costs in the future. The
case of the monetary shock (Fig. 14) is similar. The increases in flexible price
unemployment illustrate how hysteresis worsens the tradeoff for the monetary
authority between low unemployment and stable prices.
4 Conclusion
In the wake of the severe 2007-09 recession, the shift in the Beveridge curve and
the increase in unemployment duration are consistent with a model of hysteresis
in which labor market matching efficiency deteriorates as the duration of unem-
ployment increases. Integrating such a mechanism into a simple New Keynesian
model shows that hysteresis leads to more persistent dynamics of unemployment
rates and unemployment duration in response to technology, intertemporal pref-
erence, and monetary shocks. Hysteresis also leads to an increase in the natural
rate of unemployment, proxied by flexible-price level of unemployment.
The model presented in this paper has been deliberately kept simple in
order to illustrate the proposed hysteresis mechanism. Its ability to generate
more persistent dynamics of macroeconomic variables in this setting suggests
17
it might be useful for further study in the context of richer models intended to
more closely replicate empirical business cycle behavior.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
σ 2 Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution
zh 0.54 Home productivity/replacement rate
α 0.5 Matching function curvature
A¯ 0.63 Steady state matching efficiency
δ 0.05 Separation rate
κ 0.69 Vacancy posting cost
ξ 0.5 Household relative bargaining power
θ 0.75 Fraction of firms not resetting prices
ν 6 Elasticity of substitution between varieties
µ 1.2 Markup
λ 0.5 Real wage adjustment parameter
φpi 1.5 Taylor rule inflation response
φy 0.5 Taylor rule output gap response
ρZ 0.9 Persistence of productivity shocks
ρD 0.7 Persistence of discount shocks
ρM 0.5 Persistence of monetary shocks
σε,Z 0.01 Standard deviation of productivity shocks
σε,D 0.01 Standard deviation of discount shocks
σε,M 0.0025 Standard deviation of monetary shocks
Table 2: Model Standard Deviations
Output Vacancies Unemployment
No Hysteresis 2.73 18.35 9.40
Hysteresis 2.91 12.24 12.49
Table 3: Model Autocorrelations
Output Vacancies Unemployment
No Hysteresis 0.89 -0.20 0.65
Hysteresis 0.92 0.05 0.92
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Fig. 1: US Beveridge Curve, Dec. 2001 - Jan. 2016
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Fig. 3: US Beveridge Curve by Duration, Dec. 2001 - Jan. 2016
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Fig. 4: Matching Efficiency and Duration, 2001Q1 - 2015Q4
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Fig. 5: Unemployment Response to Productivity Shock
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Fig. 6: Vacancy Response to Productivity Shock
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Fig. 7: Duration Response to Productivity Shock
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Fig. 8: Inflation and Interest Rate Response to Productivity Shock
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Fig. 9: Unemployment Response to Discount Shock
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Fig. 10: Inflation and Interest Rate Response to Discount Shock
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Fig. 11: Unemployment Response to Monetary Shock
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Fig. 12: Unemployment Response to Productivity Shock
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Fig. 13: Unemployment Response to Discount Shock
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Fig. 14: Unemployment Response to Monetary Shock
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